“Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K.” (Legal firm Bernardo Cartoni & Partners Sp.K.) is due to a combination of several long experiences, in Poland and in Italy, in the field of consulting and legal aiding for private persons and corporations which operate in internal and international market.
Every partner is Polish mother tongue or Italian mother tongue and is able to speak and understand other languages, such as English, French, Russian and Chinese (elementary level).
Under the coordination of Avvocato Bernardo Cartoni, MCIArb, which is called to the Bar of Rome (No. A30908) and is called to the Bar of Warsaw (“Prawnicy zagraniczni”, foreign lawyers’ list No. A-0037) also, Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K. operates in the following fields:
- Polish commercial law, Italian commercial law and International commercial law (including drawing up a contract and collecting an internal debt or an international debt)
- Polish company law, Italian company law and international company law (including legal due diligence in case of merger and acquisition)
- Polish tax law, Italian tax law and international tax law (including advice on tax planning and transfer pricing)
- Italian criminal tax law and Polish criminal tax law
- Customs and excise law
- Italian real estate law and Polish real estate law
- International investments law
- Conflict law
- European law
- Immigration law
- Polish labour law
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K. wants to offer to clients a full backing for their economic activities in the territory of Polish Republic and in the import – export trade with Italy, above all, but with others Countries also.
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K. underlines that our services have the following features:
- Accuracy in preliminary analysis
- Theoretical elaboration and practical knowledge
- Care for client during the whole professional relation
We offer also the chance to agree upon the all-in fee for permanent consulting and extrajudicial legal aiding.
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K. wants to throw a bridge between Polish legal system and Italian legal system, guiding client beyond linguistic, regulatory and judicial differences; to that end, Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K. is starting a long-term translation program of Polish regulations into Italian language. This program is starting with translation of Trading Company Code (Kodeks Spółek Handlowych) and Criminal Financial Code (Kodeks Karny Skarbowy).
The office of “Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K.” (Legal firm Bernardo Cartoni & Partners Sp. K.”) is just in the Babka Tower, an elegant and modern business center, in the neighborhood of Muranów and just in front of CH Arkadia, on the roundabout named after the commander Radosław of Armija Krajowa (literally, National Army), which was an important character in the heroic Warsaw Uprising.
The location allows excellent connections to public transport that connect directly to the Central Station with trams passing on Aleja Jana Pawła II, but it is also near the railway station Gdańsk where comes the subway too. In the parking lot of the CH Arkadia you can always find a taxi.
Access to the offices is at the corner with Ulica Dzika, Entry C.
In Rome (Italy), you may call the office of Studio Legale Cartoni at phone number (+39) 06/44238146.
Real Estate Law
DON’T GO TO BED... TAKE YOUR TIME FOR DRAFTING “MIDNIGHT CLAUSES” WELL
THE JUDGEMENT ON THE VALIDITY OF CONTRACT AND THE POWERS OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K.
Al. Jana Pawła II 80 lok C-32
Phone: ++ 48 22 2549840
Mobile: ++ 48 791727523
Fax: ++ 48 22 4702301
Studio Legale Cartoni
Via Eleonora d’Arborea n. 30
Phone / Fax 0039 06 44238146
Company registration details
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy Sp. K.
Al. Jana Pawła II 80 lok C-32
Sąd Rejonowy dla M.St.Warszawy, XII Wydział Gospodarczy Krajowego Rejestru Sądowego
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DON’T GO TO BED... TAKE YOUR TIME FOR DRAFTING “MIDNIGHT CLAUSES” WELLIn international negotiations, often the parties focus their mind on the economic terms of contract and on certain clauses (specially, regarding mutual liability, time for performing, quality of goods or services, etc.) while little space is given to other clauses, even if such clauses are very important in case of a dispute. One of them is the choice of the law applicable to the contract.
We need care in such a choice, because the relevant material law fills all the gaps in the contract (i.e. the law provides for any case non contemplated in the text of the contract), but also the material law may overrule the parties’ agreement, if it is mandatory in certain issues. Which law is the best to apply? There is no right answer, it depends on the circumstances.
Often, the stronger party demands the law of its own country, but this can be unwise under certain circumstances.
In a recent case, in a contract between an Italian company and a Polish company, the stronger party imposed Italian law as the material law of contract.
But the parties forgot to agree on the “choice of forum” clause (another typical “midnight clause”).
So, Brusselles I Regulation applies.
When the Italian company brought its claim before an Italian Court, the Polish company objected the lack of jurisdiction of Italian Courts, because – according to art. 2 and 5 n. 1 lett. b) Brusselles I Regulation – only a Polish Court has the jurisdiction on this case. But Polish judges will be obliged to apply the material Italian law, according to art. 3 Rome I Regulation. Is this wise?
When parties are drafting a contract, they have to be careful that clauses should be consistent and they should avoid any unnecessary complication.
Parties can choose a “transnational” law as the UNIDROIT Principles, but they have to remember that the UNIDROIT Principles do not cover every possible issue, so they also have to choose a statutory law that could fill any eventual gap. Also the choice of forum is relevant and not easy.
Is it better to go before “my” Court or is it better to go before the other party’s Court, where the assets are located?
There is not “the” right answer, it depends on many factors as length of proceedings, costs, possibility of enforcement of a foreign decision and so on.
It is worth remembering that many international commercial disputes are solved by arbitration.
But, even in this case, it is wise to decide carefully what kind of arbitration is preferable.
It is difficult to do so before a dispute arises, but a well-drafted arbitration clause is timesaving and cost-saving.
First of all, we have to decide if an institutional arbitration or an ad hoc arbitration is more desirable. The latter can be more tailored on the circumstances of the case, the former offers a tested set of rules and a predetermined scale of fees. But there are many differences among the institutional arbitrations, so we need to choose the one that is the closest to our expectations.
For instance, only recently the institute of Emergency Arbitrator has taking place in various sets of rules (e.g. ICC, Swiss Chamber, LCIA and now CIETAC).
It is worth checking if the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant interim measures or order securities for costs.
For these reasons, while drafting an international contract, a legal piece of advice is very important also on these issues, provided by lawyers skilled in international trade and in arbitration.
We can conclude that it is better if you lose a couple of hours of sleep but your contract is well drafted: it is cost saving behaviour and you will avoid troubles in the future or you will minimize them.
Key words: midnight clauses, choice of law, arbitration.
THE JUDGEMENT ON THE VALIDITY OF CONTRACT AND THE POWERS OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALThe Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) has recently intervened ( 23.9.2010 Sygn . Akt III CZP 57/10 ) on the issue of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal about the validity of contract.
These are the facts. A corporation had sued a bank to nullify an agreement between them. The respondent had objected a lack of jurisdiction due to an arbitration clause referring the dispute to an arbitration panel. The Court of First Instance rejected the objection and ruled that there is the competence of the ordinary judge to hear this case (applying the Kompetenz – kompetenz principle, that every judge is the judge of its own jurisdiction); in particular, the Court of First Instance interpreted Article 1157 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code in the sense that the arbitral tribunal could know only matters in the discretion of the parties (arbitrability principle), rather the discipline of nullity of the contract is binding and outside of the willingness of the parties and, therefore, could not be deferred to the arbitral tribunal, but it must be attributable to the ordinary judge . The defense of the Bank challenged the decision, the Court of Appeal has decided to submit to the Supreme Court the question whether the issue of the nullity of a legal act could be referred to an arbitral tribunal, as the literal interpretation considers that the arbitrability of an issue arises from the possibility to have the right and there are different interpretations for the solution of the relevant issue.
The Supreme Court held that - the interpretation of the whole system - hence the principle that the arbitral tribunal is not competent about the validity of the contract would be inconsistent with the regulatory system of the arbitration. The Court ruled that the availability of the right is the only criterion to verify the possibility to refer the matter to the judgment of the arbitrators.
The decision of the Supreme Court is correct, in that the judgment on the availability or otherwise of the right in dispute must relate to the substantive law considered "staticly" (ie , a contractual obligation, a claim for damages, a nuptial tie) and not "dynamicly" (I ask for a refund of the given because the contract is void , I claim damages for negligence, I ask for divorce for incompatibility of character). Using the categories of civil procedure, the examination of the availability of the issue has to be made more on the relief sought (what is the object of my request) that the cause of action (the reason why I ask). Taking an example: a property right is almost always waived (and, therefore, be deferred to arbitration), while the dissolution of marriage is a matter unavailable and cannot be removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary judge, who will have jurisdiction over the division of the common property too. The first instance decision was incorrect, because it confused between disposable right and mandatory rule, but these concepts operate on different planes : the parties cannot change the rules of the nullity of a contract, but a party can validly renounce - for example - the return the amounts given in fulfillment of a contract void.
There are not any particular differences with the rules in force in Italy.
Real Estate Law
CHILD CITIZENSHIP MIXED COUPLES OR ITALIAN POLISH-POLISH CITIZENS LIVING IN ITALY
BRIEF REMARKS ON THE CONTRACT OF TOWAGE1. Foreword
The aim of the present article is to explain briefly, what a contract of towage is, what it happens in case of accident and what kind of damages can be awarded.2. Contract of towage in general
In Maritime Law, one fundamental contract is the contract of towage.
Often, the Parties prefer to choose England and Wales Law as material law of the contract; so, in this note, I consider the contract of towage as regulated by England and Wales Law.
Towage has been defined as “the employment of one vessel to expedite the voyage of another when nothing more is required than the accelerating of her progress” (The Princess Alice  3 W Rob 138), but now is “used for towing dead ships or unmanned barges between places and they also supply services and assistance to the offshore industry” (Y. Baatz et alii, Maritime Law, 2014, p. 250).
Obligations between the Parties are regulated by the Contract and any implied terms or statutory interventions relevant to such a contract.
At common law, one implied term in maritime contracts is the seaworthiness although the word “seaworthiness” is not present in the contract (Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd  2 QB 26); in a towage contract, the tug has to be appropriately fitted and manned (Y. Baatz et alii, Maritime Law, 2014, p. 251), while the tow has to be fit for towage, appropriately manned and the persons on board the tow must demonstrate proper skill and diligence in respect of the tow’s action whilst towing (The Julia  Lush 224) and “the tow owner can put her into that condition by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence” (S. Rainey, The law of tug and tow (and allied contracts), 2002, p. 51).
The tow must also exercise reasonable care in all the manoeuvres of the tug (The Abaris  2 Ll. L. Rep. 411) and has a duty to warn the tug of impending danger (The Niobe  13 P.D. 55).
There is no international convention on maritime towage, so “the lack of a unified international act is replaced in practice by various forms of model contracts for business (commercial) purposes” (A. Vuković, Analysis of the institute of maritime towing in BIMCO (TOWCON 2008 and TOWHIRE 2008) and the UK Standard Condition – Lessons for Croatia, in POMORSTVO – Scientific Journal of Maritime Research, n. 27/2 (2013), p. 370).
The most important model contracts are TOWCON (International Ocean Towage Agreement Lump Sum), TOWHIRE (International Ocean Towage Agreement Daily Hire) drafted by the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and the UK Standard Conditions for Towage and other Services drafted by the British Tug Owners Association.3. Obligation of the Parties and their respective liabilities.
Under Sec. 13 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, the tug “will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill”. This is an implied term of the Contract that is overridden by some specific clauses of the Contract.
The general tendency is to minimize tug liability.
Under Clause 3 UK Standard Condition the master and the crew of the tug “shall be deemed to be the servants of the Hirer”, so there is Hirer’s vicarious liability whilst towing (to wit, “the period commencing when the tug or tender is in position to receive orders direct from the Hirer’s vessel … and ending when the final order from the Hirer’s vessel … has been carried out … and the tug or tender is safely clear of the vessel” (Clause 1(b)(iv)).
This provision does not bind third parties that – in case of a collision – it may sue the tug, if the tug is in control (The M.S.C. Panther and The Ericbank  1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57).
Clause 4 excludes Tugowner’s liability for damages or loss of the tug or of the tow or of a third party’s vessel or cargo.
In the BIMCO – TOWCON form the issue of liability is addressed in Clause 25 (Clause 23 in TOWHIRE) and it is more balanced.
As it has been noticed, “under this arrangement some liabilities are allocated to the tug or the tow in relation to which they arose irrespective of whether liability would normally attach to the owner of the tug or the tow respectively” (Y. Baatz et alii, Maritime Law, 2014, p. 256), so the above mentioned clauses provide for a detailed share of liability between the Tugowner and the Hirer.
It is useful to examine if the liability limitation provided by general terms and to decide if it is valid.
I have to note that – if the Parties has chosen England and Wales law - the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 does not apply directly, because – under Sec. 27 – it does not apply where “the law applicable to a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties”.
In any case, under the provision of Schedule 1 para 2(a) UCTA shall not apply to a contract of towage (except for clauses excluding or restricting liability for death or personal injuries), unless towage is provided to a small boat or yacht owners who can be considered as consumers.
Thus, the clauses of a contract providing for a limitation of tug owner liability or reversing the burden of proof on the Hirer are valid.4. Towage and salvage.
It is possible that – during the performance of the contract – and accident may occur (e.g. a fire on the tow). How does it interfere with the contract of towage?
It is clear that if a fire occur, this it constitutes a danger; consequently, we have to decide if the contract of towage between the Parties became a salvage and, if so, what kind of consequences affected the Contract.
The 1989 Salvage Convention (hereinafter, SC) also applies to a rig, because Art. 3 SC states that the Convention does not apply to platforms or mobile offshore drilling unit only when these “are on location engaged in the exploration, exploitation or production of sea-bed mineral resources”; so, SC applies to these objects during towing operation.
Usually, a towage contract is not converted into a salvage service (see also TOWCON 2008, Clause 21 (a)). Under the rule stated by the Privy Council in The Minnehaha ( 15 Moo. P.C. 133) there must be: a) unforeseen difficulties in the completion of the tug’s task which place the tow in danger and b) the incurring of risks and the performing of duties which were “not within the scope of the original engagement”. Now, Art. 17 SC states that “No payment is due under the Provision of this Convention unless the services rendered exceed what can be reasonably considered as due performance of a contract entered into before the danger arose”. A learned author says that: “this merely codifies the principle which the court has followed since the decision in The Minnehaha” (S. Rainey, The law of tug and tow (and allied contracts), 2002, p. 199).
So, the judge (or the arbitrator) that have to decide whether a towage is converted into a salvage has to answer to the following questions:
In the present case, was the fire an unforeseen danger? And has the tug rendered services that exceed the due performance?
The burden of proof is upon the Claimant as stated in The Marechal Suchet  P. 1 and it must show no want of skill (The Robert Dixon  5 P.D. 54).
If a towage contract is converted to a salvage service, the former contract is suspended not terminated (The Leon Blum  P. 90).
What does it happen if the tow has become a “write off”?
In such a case, the towage contract could be considered as frustrated for destruction or unavailability of something essential for contract performance (Taylor v Caldwell  32 LJ QB 164). However, the parties can be discharged from their obligations only if there is no fault of either party (The Fjord Wind  2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191) and if the supervening event was not foreseeable.
Usually, the fire is an event that may occur during a towage; so, the event was deemed as foreseeable.5. Damages. Foreseeability.
Under Hadley v Baxendale  9 Ex 341, the party in breach is liable for loss which would arise naturally, “according to the usual course of things” from the breach (as costs for the repair, moorage fees, etc.) and for loss “as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time when they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it”. This approach was reaffirmed in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v Newman Industries Ltd.  2 KB 528 (liability for losses as were “reasonably foreseeable”), and such a reasonable foreseeability has to be determined at the time at which the contract was made and not at the time at which the contract was broken, as stated by the House of Lords in Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland  UKHL 3.6. Lost profits on future contracts of the tug.
What does it happen if the Tugowner claims damages for future contract that it cannot perform due to the breach of the Hirer?
What is the mental process of an arbitrator?
First of all, the claim has to pass the remoteness test.
At the time of the conclusion of the Contract (Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland  UKHL 3) was the Hirer aware of such future contract?
If the Hirer was actually aware, the claim is not too remote; if the Hirer was not, was such damage foreseeable?
The Claimant’s intention to enter into other towage contracts – even if not expressly stated in the Contract – was so probable that it should be regarded as arising in the normal course of events, and would therefore be within the contemplation of the parties at the time the Contract was made, applying the rule stated by the House of Lords in Koufos v C Czarnikow (The Heron II)  1 AC 350.
I also have to consider if the relevant market is a volatile one and whether or not the price obtainable for towing services is predictable. In Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping (The Achilleas)  UKHL 48, the House of Lords stated that in determining the issue of remoteness the courts had to take into account the parties’ apparent intentions as to where responsibility for losses should fall, as this was relevant to determining what losses the parties could have reasonably foreseen (assumption of responsibility test). Lord Hoffman said that in determining whether damages were too remote, courts should first decide whether the loss was of the kind for which the contract breaker ought fairly to have taken responsibility, while Lord Rodger’s opinion was focused on whether or not the degree of loss suffered was foreseeable.
But I also have to consider that the High Court – in Sylvia Shipping Co Ltd. v Progress Bulk Carrier Ltd.  EWHC 542 [Comm.] – stated that the assumption of responsibility test in The Achilleas should only be applied exceptionally, when the application of the general tests on remoteness would lead to an unpredictable liability or where there is clear evidence that such a liability would be contrary to market understanding and expectations. So, in applying these rules, firstly I have to apply the general tests on remoteness and if the result seems to me unfair and/or contrary to market common sense I shall apply the assumption of responsibility test.
I also have to consider another element: the losses suffered must be actual.
If the contracts that the Tugowner was not able to perform (due to Hirer’s breach) were “secured” (to wit, someone has paid the Claimant even if the Claimant has not performed such contracts), in this case, under the mitigation doctrine, the losses have been eliminated and the claim must be rejected (British Westinghouse Electric Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd No 2  AC 673).7. Damages suffered by the tow.
We have seen that England and Wales law and UK Standard Terms tend to minimize the liability of the Tugowner.
If the tug is in breach, it is liable for damages occurred to the tow under the usual rules, but we have to consider an additional issue.
There are conventional limits to the liability of a vessel.
The 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, signed in London, (hereinafter 1976 LLMC) and its additional Protocol of 1996 (hereinafter 1996 LLMC) are in force in the United Kingdom.
Pursuant to art. 15(5), 1976 LLMC applies to every ship (including tugs); actually, 1976 LLMC was applied in a claim for loss of a tow (The Caspian Basin  2 Lloyd’s Rep. 507).
The limits set forth in art. 6 LLMC are calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the ship and are expressed in IMF Special Drawing Right (art. 8 LLMC).
Art. 4 1996 LLMC provides that the limitation does apply if “it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”.8. Conclusion.
These are only brief remarks on the contract of towage that is a very important contract (even if it is not the most important) in maritime law.
A convention on towage should be useful in order to level the play field in the world of maritime industry.
Avv. Bernardo Cartoni, MCIArb
KANCELARIA PRAWNICZA BERNARDO CARTONI I WSPÓLNICY SPÓŁKA KOMANDYTOWA SEATED IN WARSAW
(Legal firm Bernardo Cartoni & Partners Sp. K.)Law office specialized in national and international commercial law and tax law, criminal-tax law, criminal economic law, customs law, national and international contracts and agreements, law of succession and civil law.
Avvocato Bernardo Cartoni (speaking Italian, Polish and English), which is called to the Bar of Rome (No. A30908) and is called to the Bar of Warsaw (“Prawnicy zagraniczni”, foreign lawyers’ list No. A-0037). From 16 July 2010, a lawyer for the Court of Cassation, he also has the power to appear beyond the UE Court of Justice.
Al. Jana Pawła II 80 lok C-32
Phone: ++ 48 22 2549840
Mobile: ++ 48 791727523
Fax: ++ 48 22 4702301
OFFICE IN ROME (ITALY) – Via Eleonora d’Arborea n. 30 CAP 00162
Phone / Fax. ++ 39 06 44238146
Large investment projects in Poland 2015-2020
Poland is currently negotiating with the European Commission, the form of the National Operational Programs financed by cohesion policy. The Polish Council of Ministers has adopted on 8 January 2014. The allocation of EU funds to the National Operational Program Infrastructure and Environment, is: 27,41 bn € for large projects in Poland in the period 2015-2020.
CURRICULUM VITAEPersonal Information
Family name: CARTONILaw firm
First name: BERNARDO
Date of birth: 13.7.1969
Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy
Aleja Jana Pawła II 80, lok. C-32, 00-175 Warsaw, Poland
Tel +48 22 2549840
- Italian (native speaker)
- English (fluent)
- Polish (intermediate)
- French (elementary level)
- Chinese (elementary level)
- LL.M. (University of Rome “LA SAPIENZA”, 1992)
- Advanced Certificate in International Arbitration (CIArb, 2015)
- Italy – Ordine degli Avvocati of Rome (1998)
- Poland – Okręgowa Rada Adwokacka of Warsaw (2009)
- Italian Supreme Court (2010)
- MCIArb (2015)
Area of specialisation:
- Criminal Tax Law
- Tax Law
- Corporate Law (including M&A)
- International Law
- International trade (including Sales, Franchising, Agency)
- Litigation and Arbitration
- 4/2010 – now Kancelaria Prawnicza Bernardo Cartoni i Wspólnicy, Warsaw (Poland), Founder
- 1/1998 – now Studio Legale Cartoni, Rome (Italy), Founder
- 5/1995 – now Angeloni Law Firm, Montefiascone (Italy), of Counsel
- 11/1993 – 11/2007 Andreoli Law Firm, Rome (Italy), of Counsel
- 1/1998 – 3/2002 Ferrazzani Law Firm, Viterbo (Italy), Associate
- 10/1992 – 12/1997 Ferrazzani Law Firm, Viterbo (Italy), Junior Lawyer
- 02/1991 – 11/1993 Ghia Law Firm, Rome (Italy) Trainee
- POLITICA E MAGISTRATURA NELL’ANTICA ROMA. DIZIONARIO DELLE ISTITUZIONI ROMANE (Politics and magistrature in ancient Rome. A dictionary of Roman institutions), BERGAMO, OBERON EDITORE, 1995
- COMMENTO AD ORDINANZA TRIB. VITERBO 13.11.1998 (Comment on a decision of the Tribunale of Viterbo dated 13.11.1998) IN TEMA DI APPLICAZIONE DIRETTA DEL PRINCIPIO DI SPECIALITA’ IN FORZA DELLA PREVISIONE INSERITA NELL’ART.3, COMMA 133, L. 662/96, IN “IL FISCO”, N. 13/99, P. 4512 (CON R. FERRAZZANI)
- COMMENTO AD ORDINANZA GUP TRIB. VITERBO 31.3.1999 (Comment on a decision of the Judge of preliminary hearing of the Tribunale of Viterbo dated 31.3.1999) IN TEMA DI RIMESSIONE ALLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE DELL‘OMESSA PREVISIONE DEL PRINCIPIO DI SPECIALITA‘ NEL D.LGS. 472/97 PER CONTRASTO CON L‘ART. 76 COST., IN “IL FISCO”, N. 21/1999, P. 7061 (CON R. FERRAZZANI)
- “IL PRINCIPIO DI SPECIALITA’ NEL NUOVO DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO. UNA RIFORMA A META’” (The specialty principle in new criminal tax law. A reform half done), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 10/2000, P. 2835
- “L’ERRORE INTERPRETATIVO NEL NUOVO DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (The interpretative mistake in new criminal tax law), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 19/2000, P. 6465
- COMMENTO A SENTENZA CASS. SEZ. I CIVILE 5.7.2000 N. 8965 (Comment on decision n. 8975 of the Italian Supreme Court dated 5.7.2000), IN TEMA DI AMMISSIONE AL PASSIVO DEL CREDITO ERARIALE, IN “GUIDA NORMATIVA”, N. 134/2000, P. 16 (CON E. D’INNELLA)
- “IL REATO DI OMESSA DICHIARAZIONE TRA VECCHIO E NUOVO DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (The criminal offence of omitted tax statement between old and new criminal tax law), IN “IMPRESA C.I.”, N. 9/2000, P. 1378
- “LA SCRIMINANTE DEL RULING”, (The justification of ruling), IN “IL FISCO” N. 42/2000, P. 12537
- “CARENZE REPRESSIVE CONSEGUENTI ALLA SENTENZA DELLE SEZIONI UNITE SULL’ART. 4 LETT. D) DELLA L. N. 516/1982” (Lack of repression due to a decision of the Joint Chambers of the Italian Supreme Court), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 10/2001, P. 3894
- COMMENTO AD ORDINANZA COMM. TRIB. PROVINCIALE DI VITERBO SEZ. I 2.4.2001 N. 31(Comment on a decision of the First Instance Tax Commission of Viterbo dated 2.4.2001) IN TEMA DI UTILIZZABILITA’ DEI C/C BANCARI DEI SOCI IN CASO DI VERIFICA ALLA SOCIETA’, IN “IL FISCO”, N. 39/2001, P. 12887
- “NATURA GIURIDICA DELLA SOGLIA DI PUNIBILITA’ E SUE CONSEGUENZE PRATICHE” (Juridical nature of the punishability threshold and its pratical outcomes), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 1/2002, P. 1-130
- COMMENTO A SENTENZA COMM. TRIB. REGIONALE DI ROMA SEZ. XLIII 19.5.2001 N. 58 (Comment on a decision of the Second Instance Tax Commission of Rome dated 19.5.2001) IN TEMA DI VALENZA PROBATORIA DEL GIUDICATO PENALE NEL PROCESSO TRIBUTARIO, IN “IL FISCO”, N. 25/2002, P. 1-9680
- “PROCEDIMENTO PENALE PENDENTE ED ACCESSO ALLE PROCEDURE DI CONDONO: UN RAPPORTO PROBLEMATICO” (Pending criminal proceedings and access to tax amnesty procedure: a problematic connection) IN “IL FISCO”, N. 12/2003, P. 1-1856
- “GLI EFFETTI PENALI DELLE SANATORIE FISCALI” (Criminal effects of tax amnesty), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 17/2003, P. 1-2622
- “LE VALUTAZIONI ESTIMATIVE ‘SINGOLARMENTE CONSIDERATE’” (The appraisal evaluations “one by one considered”), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 35/2003, P. 1-5511
- “I REATI TRIBUTARI: DEFINIZIONI E DELITTI IN MATERIA DI DICHIARAZIONE” (Criminal tax offences: definitions and criminal offences on the matter of tax statement), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 45/2003, P. 1-7074
- “PROFILI PENALI DEL RULING INTERNAZIONALE” (Criminal profiles of international ruling), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 2/2004, P. 1-250
- “CONDONO DELLA SOCIETA’ UTILIZZATRICE DI FATTURE PER OPERAZIONI INESISTENTI E CONSEGUENZE PENALI PER GLI AMMINISTRATORI E L’EMITTENTE” (Tax amnesty of the user of fraudulent invoices and criminal consequences on managers and drawer), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 4/2004, P. 1-567
- COMMENTO A SENTENZA GUP TRIB. VITERBO 23.2.2004 (Comment on a decision of the Judge of preliminary hearing of the Tribunale of Viterbo dated 23.2.2004) IN TEMA DI ESTENSIONE ALL’EMITTENTE FATTURE PER OPERAZIONI INESISTENTI DEL CONDONO RICHIESTO DALLA SOCIETA’ UTILIZZATRICE, IN “IL FISCO”, N. 11/2004, P. 1-1687
- “FATTURAZIONE ELETTRONICA E REATI TRIBUTARI” (Electronic invoicing and criminal tax offences), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 22/2004, P. 1-3417
- “LA RILEVANZA PENALE DEL CONCORDATO PREVENTIVO TRA DUBBI (TANTI) E CERTEZZE (POCHE)” (Criminal significace of the advanced composition between doubts (many) and certainties (few), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 24/2004, P. 1-3724
- “’LEGGE FINANZIARIA 2005’ E DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (Financial act 2005 and criminal tax law), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 38/2004, P. 1-6566
- “NOTE MINIME SUGLI EFFETTI PENALI DELLA ‘PIANIFICAZIONE FISCALE CONCORDATA’” (Minimal remarks on criminal effects of “agreed tax planning”), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 44/2004, P. 1-7488
- “L’INCIDENZA DELLA LEGGE FINANZIARIA 2005 SUL DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (Effects of Financial act 2005 on criminal tax law), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 7/2005, P. 1-1038
- “AZIONE PENALE NEI CONFRONTI DELL’AMMINISTRATORE ED INIBIZIONE DEL CONDONO PER LA SOCIETA’” (Criminal proceedings against manager and prohibition of tax amnesty for the company), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 29/2005, P. 1-4595
- “TIPOLOGIE DI REDDITO AI FINI DEL RILASCIO DELLA CARTA DI SOGGIORNO” (Typologies of income in order to the issue of a residence permit), IN WWW.IMMIGRAZIONE.IT, N. 12/2005
- “PROCEDIMENTO PENALE PENDENTE E PRECLUSIONE AL CONDONO: QUANDO LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE (APPARENTEMENTE) CONTRADDICE SE STESSA”(Pending criminal proceedings and tax amnesty prohibition: when the Constitutional Court (seemingly) contradicts itself), IN “IL FISCO”, N. 45/2005, P. 1-6991
- “REATI TRIBUTARI E COMPETENZA TERRITORIALE: IL DOMICILIO FISCALE PREVALE SULLA (PRESUNTA) SEDE EFFETTIVA” (Criminal tax offences and territorial jurisdiction: tax domicile prevails over the (presumed) effective seat), COMMENTO ALLA SENTENZA GUP TRIB. VITERBO 5.10.2006 N. 228, IN “RIVISTA DI DIRITTO TRIBUTARIO”, N. 1/2007, IV. P. 10
- “IL REATO DI OMESSA DICHIARAZIONE, ART. 5 D.Lgs. 10.3.2000 N. 74” (The criminal offence of omitted tax statement) (IN “COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLE LEGGI TRIBUTARIE” (Brief commentary on tax laws), TOMO II – ACCERTAMENTO E SANZIONI, EDIT. FALSITTA FANTOZZI MARONGIU MOSCHETTI, CEDAM, 2011, P. 569)
- “ADMISSIBILITY AND VALUE OF OLAF PRODUCED EVIDENCE: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE”, (IN “EVIDENCE IN EU FRAUD CASES”, EDIT. NOWAK, LEX, 2013, P. 91)
- “INTERIM MEASURES ABROAD AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: BRIEF REMARKS ON A RECENT CASE”, IN “ASIAN LAW eJOURNAL”, Vol. 13, Issue 87, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2676155
- “BRIEF REMARKS ON THE CONTRACT OF TOWAGE”, IN WWW.REASEARCHGATE.NET, DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.1723.1201
- “SMALL CLAIMS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW”, IN “COMPARATIVE LAW eJOURNAL”, Vol. 15, Issue 90, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2641318
- “IS THE CISG APPLICABLE TO HONG KONG-RELATED DISPUTES?”, IN “ASIAN LAW eJOURNAL", Vol. 13, Issue 68, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2648323
- “A RISING STAR: THE EMERGENCY ARBITRATOR” IN “TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION/ARBITRATION, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW & CONFLICT OF LAWS eJOURNAL”, Vol. 3, Issue 3, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2710552
- “THE EMERGENCY ARBITRATOR UNDER CIETAC RULES 2015” IN “IBA ARBITRATION NEWSLETTER”, Vol 21, n 1, February 2016
- “OSSERVAZIONI GENERALI SULLA RIFORMA DEL DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (General remarks on the criminal tax law reform) (IN “I NUOVI REATI TRIBUTARI” (The new tax criminal offences), EDITOR IVO CARACCIOLI, GIUFFRE’, 2016, P. 6)
- “THE EXPEDITED PROCEDURE IN MARITIME ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW”, IN “ASIAN LAW eJOURNAL", Vol. 15, Issue 43, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2970025
- 11.4.2003 VITERBO: “GLI EFFETTI PENALI DELLE SANATORIE FISCALI” (Criminal effects of tax amnesty), ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVENGNO “IL CONDONO FISCALE: OPPORTUNITA’ PER I CONTRIBUENTI E RUOLO DEI PROFESSIONISTI E DELLE BANCHE”, ORGANIZZATO DAL “CENTRO DI DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” ASSIEME ALL’ORDINE DEI DOTTORI COMMERCIALISTI ED AL COLLEGIO DEI RAGIONIERI COMMERCIALISTI DI VITERBO
- 14.10.2003 ROMA: “DEFINIZIONI E DELITTI IN MATERIA DI DICHIARAZIONE” (Definition and criminal offences in tax statement), ALL’INTERNO DEL SEMINARIO DI AGGIORNAMENTO E FORMAZIONE “PERITO E CONSULENTE NEL PROCEDIMENTO PENALE” ORGANIZZATO DALL’ORDINE DEI DOTTORI COMMERCIALISTI DI ROMA
- 7.4.2006 TORINO: “GLI EFFETTI DELLE RIFORME DEL PROCESSO PENALE NEL DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (Reform on criminal proceedings and its effects on criminal tax law), ALL’INTERNO DELL’INCONTRO DI AGGIORNAMENTO CON I SOCI DEL “CENTRO DI DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO”
- 29/30.3.2007 ROMA: “LE SANZIONI PENALI TRIBUTARIE” (Penalties in criminal tax law), DOCENZA IN SEMINARIO SPECIALISTICO PER N. 14 ORE DI LEZIONE ORGANIZZATO DALLA SCUOLA SUPERIORE DELL’ECONOMIA E DELLE FINANZE
- 9.5.2013 ROMA: “L’AZIONE ANTIECONOMICA. ASPETTI FISCALI E PENALI NEL CONSOLIDATO INTERNO E NEI RAPPORTI INFRAGRUPPO” (The “uneconomic action”. Tax and criminal aspects in consolidated balance sheet and in relationships inside a group of companies), CONCLUSIONI DEL CONVEGNO ORGANIZZATO DAL “CENTRO DI DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” ASSIEME ALL’”UNIONE DELLE CAMERE DEGLI AVVOCATI TRIBUTARISTI”
- 29.6.2013 MILANO: “ASPETTI PROCESSUALI DEI REATI DI CUI AGLI ARTT. 10-BIS E 10-TER D.LGS. 74/00. IL REATO DI INDEBITA COMPENSAZIONE” (Procedural aspects of criminal offence provided by artt. 10-bis and 10-ter D.Lgs. 74/00. The criminal offence of undue set-off), DOCENZA DI 2 ORE NEL CORSO DI SPECIALIZZAZIONE IN DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO ORGANIZZATO DA JUST LEGAL SERVICES
- 25.3.2014 VILLANOVA DI GUIDONIA: “IL CONCORSO DEL COMMERCIALISTA” (The professional accountant as partner in crime), ALL’INTERNO DELLA GIORNATA DI APPROFONDIMENTO “LA RESPONSABILITA’ DEL COMMERCIALISTA NELLE CONDOTTE PENALMENTE RILEVANTI DEL CLIENTE IN AMBITO TRIBUTARIO” ORGANIZZATO DALL’ORDINE DEI DOTTORI COMMERCIALISTI ED ESPERTI CONTABILI DI TIVOLI
- 5.5.2014 ROMA: “ASPETTI PENALI DELL’ANTIECONOMICITA’” (Criminal aspects of the “uneconomic action”), ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVEGNO “ANTIECONOMICITA’. CRITERI DI VALUTAZIONE DELL’ATTIVITA’ DEL CONTRIBUENTE. PROFILI TRIBUTARI DI DIRITTO INTERNO E COMPARATO” ORGANIZZATO DAL “CENTRO DI DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” E DALL’”UNIONE DEGLI AVVOCATI EUROPEI”
- 26.9.2014 VITERBO: “POLONIA: OPPORTUNITA’ D’INVESTIMENTO” (Poland: an investment opportunity) ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVEGNO PERIODICO “PARLIAMONE INSIEME” ORGANIZZATO DAL COLLEGIO DEI CONSULENTI DEL LAVORO DI VITERBO
- 15.12.2014 BERGAMO: “I REATI DICHIARATIVI” (Criminal offences in tax statements) ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVEGNO “PROCEDIMENTO E PROCESSO TRIBUTARIO – LA DIFESA DEL CONTRIBUENTE” ORGANIZZATO DAL CONSIGLIO DELL’ORDINE DEGLI AVVOCATI DI BERGAMO
- 11.3.2015 BERGAMO: “NUOVE OPPORTUNITA’ DI BUSINESS: LA POLONIA” (New business oppurtinities: Poland) ROADSHOW ORGANIZZATO DALLA COMPAGNIA DELLE OPERE DI BERGAMO
- 20.11.2015 TORINO: “APPUNTI SPARSI SULLA RIFORMA DEL DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO” (Uncollected notes on criminal tax law reform) ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVEGNO “LA RIFORMA DEI REATI TRIBUTARI (D.LGS. 158/2015)” ORGANIZZATO DA ANTI E CENTRO DI DIRITTO PENALE TRIBUTARIO
- 21.6.2016 ROMA: “LE SANZIONI PENALI” (Penalties in criminal tax law) ALL’INTERNO DEL CONVEGNO “NUOVE SANZIONI AMMINISTRATIVE E PENALI IVA” ORGANIZZATO DA ODCEC ROMA
- Bar of Rome
- Bar of Warsaw
- CIArb – Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London, UK
- Centro di diritto penale tributario (Centre for criminal tax law), Turin, Italy
- ECLS European China Law Studies Association, Hamburg, Germany
- International Bar Association
Membership in Arbitral Associations / Institution:
- CIArb – Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London, UK
- LCIA – London Court of International Arbitration, UK
- ASA – Association Suisse de l’Arbitrage, CH
- AIA – Associazione Italiana per l’Arbitrato, IT
- AtlAS – Atlanta International Arbitration Society, USA
Avv. Bernardo Cartoni